THE URBAN REDENSIFICATION OF MEXICO CITY AND COVID 19[1]

LA REDENSIFICACIÓN URBANA DE LA CIUDAD DE MÉXICO Y EL COVID 19

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Políticas públicas como la redensificación urbana, antes que meras intervenciones técnicas ante problemas concretos, funcionan como mecanismos de poder. Analizar la visibilización de las políticas de vida –biopolítica– y de muerte –necropolítica– en la Ciudad de México derivada de la pandemia del COVID-19, permitirá comprender esta función. Además, dará cuenta de la paradoja de que una misma política, la redensificación, sea un fracaso como política pública y simultáneamente un éxito como política de vida y de muerte. A partir de la sociología y con base en una metodología genealógica, se estudian datos relativos a los efectos de la redensificación urbana y de la pandemia en la Ciudad de México, para entrecruzarlos y reconocer una relación entre ambos. Se presta especial atención al periodo de confinamiento no obligatorio y a dos demarcaciones colindantes de la Ciudad de México: Iztapalapa y Benito Juárez. Se reconoce así una configuración de clase del espacio ligada a la planificación urbana que incidió en las consecuencias localizadas de la pandemia.

Palabras clave: biopolítica, necropolítica, Ciudad de México, Covid-19, redensificación

Public policies such as urban redensification, rather than mere technical interventions addressing concrete problems, work as a power mechanism. Analyzing the visibility of the politics of life - biopolitics - and of death - necropolitics - in Mexico City derived from the COVID-19 pandemic will allow an understanding of this. In addition, it will allow revealing the paradox that the same policy, redensification, is a failure as a public policy and, simultaneously, a success as a policy of life and death. Starting from sociology and based on a genealogical methodology, data on the effects of urban redensification and the pandemic in Mexico City were analyzed, to subsequently intertwine them and recognize a relationship between them. Special attention was paid to the period of non-compulsory confinement and two neighboring districts of Mexico City: Iztapalapa and Benito Juárez. Thus recognizing a class configuration of space linked to urban design that influenced the localized consequences of the pandemic.

Keywords: biopolitics, necropolitics, Mexico City, covid-19, redensification

I. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between population control and space was evident during the COVID-19 pandemic and was essential for its containment. Consider, for example, the lockdowns and mobility restrictions. However, the pandemic interacted with forms of space-related social control. To recognize them, it is proposed here to pay attention to the effects of urban redensification in Mexico City (CDMX) and those of the pandemic, to make the relationship between them visible.

Population control, alongside practices and behaviors, encompasses life and death. These are the areas of its competence because they generate or maintain certain social functioning. Here, for example, is the management of birth and mortality.

To talk about control is to talk about power. This especially has an impact on life and death through the ways to manage them: *biopolitics* (Foucault, 2000) and *necropolitics* (Mbembe, 2011). Therefore, it is worth asking: in what way are the policies of life – biopolitics– and death –necropolitics– made visible in Mexico City with the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically those related to the urban redensification policy that has been implemented since the start of this century?

To answer this, a comparison of the effects of COVID-19 will be made between two neighboring areas with a similar population density and a dissimilar socioeconomic configuration (Table 3, Table 4, Table 5, Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8) during the "lockdown". It will be noted how the same process, replanning CDMX through redensification, influenced the constitution of biopolitical and necropolitical processes. These sectors are the municipalities of Benito Juárez (BJ) and Iztapalapa (Figure 1). The first is homogeneously populated by middle and upper sectors - a situation related to gentrification linked to urban redensification[3]-; while Iztapalapa has historically been home to the working classes.

Gentrification functions as a power mechanism that acts on the reconstruction of urban areas and influences the location of certain groups in specific spaces. This brought these groups closer to or further away from illness and death.

The objective of this work is to recognize that redensification, by consolidating class spaces, influenced the way the consequences of COVID-19 were spatialized.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Power and urban space

Foucault (2006) identifies three types of power: the sovereign, the discipline, and the security. The sovereign acts on the territory, discipline on the individual, and security on the population. They all have an expression in space. The sovereign, through the law and the ability to implement it in a specific space, the territory. The discipline is of a strict nature and builds under specific guidelines, from which there should be no distance. Any negativity has to be avoided or rectified. Spatially, this translates into building from scratch, in empty or emptied spaces, in a spatial design that involves outlines, aesthetics, relationships, activities, and meanings. There reigns a principle of functional localization, separation, and homogenization that seeks a certain perfection.

The security power does not have that totalizing and homogeneous longing. It accepts negativities as long as they are reduced to a minimum and the positive is potentialized (Foucault, 2006, p. 39). It does not correct specific acts, and negativities are treated by handling the *probability* of occurrence. In the face of the restrictive, localizing, and homogeneous nature of the discipline, it highlights mobility and polyfunctionality, including negativities.

In the words of Foucault:

> What is a good street? A street is one in which there is [...] circulation [...] diseases, [...]. Merchandise will be taken down the street, in which there will also be shops. Thieves and possibly rioters will also be able to move down the street. Therefore, all these different functions of the town, some positive and others negative, will have to be built into the plan. (2006, p. 39)

The power mechanisms are not replaced, they converge at the same time. What varies is what prevails.

Biopolitics and Necropolitics

Linked to security, is *biopolitics*. It acts through population control, in the form of a non-individualized human species crossed by the biological (Foucault, 2000). It is attentive to birth, morbidity, old age, and the effects of the environment (including the city). It is a set of techniques, abilities, and practices - a technology - related to medicine and statistics.

The associated diseases and deaths are endemic, not epidemic in nature: "illness as phenomena affecting a

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3   On the gentrification-redensification relationship in Mexico City, see Aguayo (2015), Novoa (2016), Delgadillo (2016), Masato (2017), and Gómez (2018).

population. Death was no longer something that suddenly swooped down on life- as in an epidemic. Death was now something permanent, something that slips in life, […] diminishes and weakens it (Foucault, 2000, p. 221).

In the sovereign, life is also present, note its maxim, "to make live and let die". To let die is not restricted to murder, it includes "every indirect form of murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on." (Foucault, 2000, p. 232). Biopolitics reverses that "to make live and let die" maxim.

Mbembe (2011), on the other hand, notes that biopolitics is insufficient to explain "the contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death" (p. 75) and proposes *necropolitics*. It is not the biological management of life, but a power of death over specific groups that revitalizes the sovereign. Space, in this context, is useful for physical and geographical control, just as can be taken from his concept of "territorialization":

> it is a matter of writing on the ground a new set of social and spatial relations. [...] ("territorialization") produced boundaries and hierarchies, zones and enclaves; the classification of people according to different categories; resource extraction; and, finally, the manufacturing of a large reservoir of cultural imaginaries. (Mbembe, 2011, p. 43)

Mbembe categorizes space as "the raw material of sovereignty and the violence it carried with it" (2011, p. 43), conceptualizing the former as "the ability to define who is important and who is not, who is devoid of value and can be easily substituted and who is not" (p. 46).

Although this author connects territorialization with sovereignty, these processes are also visible in scenarios where security prevails with discipline. An example of this is gentrification which redraws borders from inscriptions of new relationships from the reconfiguration of urban space.

Gržinić (cit. in Estévez, 2018) emphasizes that biopolitics is reserved for the first world, and in the second and third, necropolitics echoes. In the first, "lifestyles" are built, in the others, "death is administered". These geographical specificities do not just distinguish countries. Now big cities, within the framework of globalization, can contain the great distances, conflicts, and contradictions that used to differentiate countries (Augé, 2007). The same space, the same city, can contain biopolitical and necropolitical processes. For example, when Mbembe, referring to Gilroy, reflects on the slave plantations where their "inhabitants live non-synchronously" (2011, p. 32). Without equating slavery on a plantation with urban inequality, it is possible to say that in today's large cities, their inhabitants can live non-synchronously.

Gentrification

"Gentrification" encompasses a diverse number of situations where there is urban segregation. It is clarified that it will regain and problematize, its "classic" meaning, "a bourgeoisification by substitution of the residents of a given urban sector" (Díaz Parra, 2015, p. 14). Generally linked to the compactness and supposed land grabbing and housing of European cities, Latin American gentrification occurs in low and middle-income sectors, and owners of the homes they occupy (Valadez & Sabatini, 2017). Thus, displacements are no longer inevitable (Sabatini, Sarella & Vásquez, 2009) (Valadez & Sabatini, 2017). Gentrification not only displaces; it also acts as a homogenizing filter by establishing who inhabits a space.

Gentrification is a construction of space made possible from its material and symbolic transformation, which entails a change of practices, relationships, meanings, and, even, architecture. It distinguishes an exercise of power and the imposition of a life project. It is more notorious if it occurs from interventions in the space with planning policies. In this way, this life project is civilizing. It has even been defined as "neighborhood-scale colonialism" (Clark, 2005, p. 266).

Urban redensification

Redensification is an urban planning policy that seeks to concentrate the population in certain areas. It is linked to smart development and is commonly accompanied by verticalization, mixing land uses, renovation, and urban recycling. Its "technical" *raison d'être* is efficient management of space to take advantage of areas with underutilized potential.

The redensification discussed here is related to sustainability, liberal democracy, and the Global City. Hence, it is located in a concrete historical framework where the nation-state has reformulated its link with capitalism, and a service economy is consolidated - where the financial and the information dominate.

In this historical framework, city design will not only be an expression of the values of democracy, tertiary capitalism, and globalization but a way of achieving and consolidating them - as can be seen in HABITAT II (United Nations [UN], 1996)-: a better, fairer, and ecological world from the city building. Within this model, redensification, under

the concept of sustainability, will be paramount (UN, 1996), and it will be an adjuvant in the building of the relationships and practices desired for the large cities of the 21st century.

Nevertheless, it is linked to gentrification. Densification is linked to an increase in land rents (Jaramillo, 2008, p. 191), which, in turn, occurs with real estate speculation and socio-spatial segregation (Trivelli, 1982; Rodríguez, 2014; Encinas, Truffello, Aguirre & Hidalgo, 2019).

III. CASE STUDY.

Urban redensification in Mexico City

Although there have been previous redensifying experiences in Mexico City, the one since 2000, when the institutionalization of the Global City model took place in CDMX, will be addressed (Novoa, 2018). It went from a model focused on small and medium-sized cities to seeking to establish internationally competitive tertiary cities (Presidency of the Republic [PR], 2001). In the goal of forming a global city, urban planning was an essential third party. If building a space is to generate guidelines for relationships, meanings, and acts, it is possible to see the reason behind this. Jobs, companies, production, and forms of consumption linked to a globalized and tertiary city were made possible. Under the banner of sustainability and through redensification, this planning took on particular architectural expressions, while gentrification came hand in hand. In the map of Figure 2, the concentration of light, medium, and advanced gentrification and unchanged areas can be noted in BJ, while in Iztapalapa, areas of decline dominate **4**, and some with light gentrification.

CDMX is divided into 16 areas, but look at 13 of them, 9 with conservation land**5**, and 4 considered central. The latter had population decline trends, adequate infrastructure, and underutilized spaces. Redensification was located there for population concentration and protection of conservation land.

The focus on BJ and Iztapalapa is justified by their proximity, socioeconomic disparity, and high population density; a point of special interest for the pandemic. If the population concentration was conducive to infection, then high population densities were problematic. Contrasting both will reveal that population density was


Figure 1. Map of CDMX. Source: Preparation by the author.

only an inconvenience when compared with other factors. When doing so, this is not an attempt to draw a linearity on the relocation of people displaced from BJ in Iztapalapa, but to recognize how the construction of the space was part of the class consolidation in both localities.

IV. METHODOLOGY

This paper is a genealogical analysis of interwoven data related to the urban redensification of CDMX and the effects the COVID-19 pandemic had on that city. It is an interpretative exercise based on the analysis of figures and documentary review. Genealogy seeks to rebuild the possibility conditions of an event by exalting its historical singularity, breaking historical linearities, denying original causes, and simple cause-effect causal linearities (Foucault, 2004). It tries to recognize redensification as a possible condition of the concrete spatialization of the pandemic consequences in CDMX as a

4 Decline refers to the opposite of gentrification, the population change towards groups of lower socioeconomic status (Bournazou, 2015)

5 Conservation land is for recharging aquifers; as a barrier against particles, caused by pollution, hoppers, and fires; CO2 capture and soil stability (Environmental and Territorial Planning Office [PAOT], no date).

Figure 2. Map of gentrification and decline in CDMX, ITSEa (2000-2010). Source: Bournazou (2015), cited in Valadez and Sabatini (2017). a Socio-spatial Transformation Index.

central element of Mexico City's replanning with gentrifying effects.

Regarding redensification, data from development programs and the National Institute of Geography and Statistics [INEGI] are contrasted. As for the pandemic, the source was the Ministry of Health of the Mexican Government and data from the National Council of Science and Technology [CONACyT].

The data were used for a comparative exercise. In the case of redensification, a comparison was made between the alternative redensification plan of the Federal District within its General Urban Development Program (PGDUDF) (Gobierno del Distrito Federal [GDF], 2003) and the population censuses of 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020 (INEGI). To analyze the effects of the pandemic on the city, Mexican government data were used, contrasting municipal data on cases and deaths in Benito Juárez

and Iztapalapa. The work covers the period from the end of the "National Healthy Distance Day" (JNSD, in Spanish), at the end of May, to September 2020. This limit is due to the need to include the lockdown and mobility as variables.

V. RESULTS

The redensifying failure

In 10 years, 1,151 hectares of conservation land were lost[6]. Of the 9 areas with conservation land, 7 exceeded the desired growth (INEGI, 2020). The differences varied by area. In some cases, the difference is apparently insignificant, although observing the year when the registered population would have appeared in the planned scenario, such an assessment is false (Table 1).

6   This is the result of contrasting the number of hectares reported in the General Development Program of the Federal District 2013-2018 (GDF, 2013) and the PGDUDF of 2003.

	INEGI	E.P.	Difference %	Year.*
Á. Obregón	759,137	723,749	4.89	2068
Cuajimalpa	217,686	172,819	25.96	2164
Magdalena Contreras	247,622	240,213	3.08	2050
Milpa Alta	152,685	116,786	30.74	2147
Tláhuac	392,313	357,878	9.62	2937
Tlalpan	699,928	631,059	10.91	2123
Xochimilco	442,178	417,883	5.81	2114

Table 1. Percentage difference between the planned scenario and population census of municipalities with conservation land in 2020 and their year in the planned scenario.TSource: Preparation by the author using data from the PGDUDF (2003) and the 2020 Census (INEGI).
* Year of the census population considering the planned scenario. Namely, the year when the population registered by the INEGI in 2020 would have been presented considering the GDF's planned scenario (2003). These data were obtained by making a projection that takes the population indicated for 2025 and the growth rate for each area in the PGDUDF planned scenario as a starting point (GDF, 2003).
The years when the population registered in 2020 are far off the target is because, in wanting to avoid population growth there, almost zero growth rates were expected. For example, the case of Tláhuac with a growth rate of 0.01% (GDF, 2003).

Entity	INEGI	E.P.	Difference %	Year.*
Federal District	9,209,944	9,199,857	0.11	2020
Benito Juárez	434,153	383,620	13.17	2066
Cuauhtémoc	545,883	560,190	-2.55	2012
Miguel Hidalgo	414,470	388,828	6.59	2041
Venustiano Carranza	443,704	480,780	-7.71	Not applicable

Table 2. Percentage difference between the planned scenario and the population census of central municipalities of 2020 and their location in this scenario. Source: Preparation by the author with data from PGDUDF (2003) and INEGI (2020).

Of the four areas to be redensified, Venustiano Carranza kept a constant population decrease until 2015, changing the trend to 2020. Even so, there are fewer inhabitants than reported in 2000. Cuauhtémoc has maintained constant growth, although far from the planned one. Its population in 2020 was 545,883 inhab., the amount forecast for 2012 (GDF, 2003)**7** (Table 2).

Miguel Hidalgo and BJ considerably exceeded the forecasts. MH registered, in 2010, 372,889 inhabitants, but it was just short of reaching the forecast of 377,431. By 2015, with 364,439 (INEGI, 2015), it reduced its population below what would have been expected in 2006. From 2015 to 2020 it grew enormously, reaching 414,470 inhabitants, which was expected for 2041**8**(Table 2).

BJ currently has 434,153 inhabitants, the expected population for 2066**9**. This data should not be surprising, as it maintains the trend already evident in 2010. At that time, the population counted -385,439 – was the one expected for 2022. It should be noted that 388,898 inhabitants were expected by 2025 (GDF, 2003) (Table 2).

All of this should be observed taking into account that the general growth of CDMX to 2020 was 0.1% above the planned scenario (Table 2).

7   Considering a growth of 0.32% (GDF, 2003), a population of 545,823 was expected for 2012.

8   Considering a growth of 0.3% (GDF, 2003), for 2020-2025 and the municipality of Miguel Hidalgo (this data was used because it was the last period indicated in the planned scenario), a population of 414,031 was expected in 2041.

9   Considering a growth of 0.27% (GDF, 2003), for 2020-2025 and the municipality of Benito Juárez (this data was used because it was the last period indicated in the planned scenario), the population closest to that reported in 2020 would have been expected in 2066, with 434,357.

Percentage of owner-occupied homes

Figure 3. Percentage of homes inhabited by owners between 2000-2020, in CDMX. Source: Preparation by the author using data from INEGI (2000, 2010, 2020).

In addition, this period saw the number of homes inhabited by their owners decrease by 15% (INEGI, 2000, 2010, 2020) (Figure 3).

Recognizing the relationship between densification and the rise in land rent, it is understood that the places affected by these dynamics become attractive for "investment". Thus, BJ is the first place to offer residential apartments for rent -at between 15 and 30 thousand Mexican pesos - and residential housing -at between 30 and 80 thousand pesos-, in CDMX. BJ also comes top in the percentage of residential real estate supply, contributing 18% of the total in CDMX. Iztapalapa is in first place in the offer of economic/social housing for rent – up to 5 thousand pesos - and, with 5% of the general offer of CDMX, it is tied with Cuajimalpa, behind 7 other municipalities (Lamudi, 2019).

Spatialization of life and death in Mexico City during lockdown

In the Municipal Human Development Report 2010-2015 of the United Nations (UN) (United Nations Development Program [PNUD], 2019), a high Human Development Index (HDI)**10** was reported in the municipality of BJ. It also pointed out that, although CDMX improved its living standards, inequality remained (UNDP, 2019, p. 194); inequality that would be a factor in the exposure to death during the pandemic.

The ravages of the pandemic were focalized on specific bodies and marked by that inequality. At the end of May 2020, in Mexico, 71% of those killed by COVID-19 had primary schooling or less; while the population that did not have a job – was unpaid, unemployed, housewives, retirees, and pensioners - comprised 46% of the deaths (Hernández, 2020). Precariousness is thus confirmed as a facilitator of death.

Lockdown in Mexico was neither mandatory nor punishable. The reason was not wanting to punish people for their socioeconomic status, given that a large part of the population lives "day-to-day" and going out is necessary for their livelihood. Staying at home was a privilege.

At the national level, BJ was the best-rated municipality in restricting mobility by staying at home, reducing its mobility by 75% (PR, 2020). Iztapalapa, during the same week, reduced it by 35% (Quintero, 2020).

The lockdown policy in Mexico can be thought of in two stages: the JNSD and the restriction of mobility and activities under the Risk Traffic Light system. The JNSD was in place from March 23rd to May 30th. It highlights the suspension of productive, work, and school activities. From May 30th, a population management policy and activities using a traffic light system were established. Red indicated a maximum risk – practically the continuity of JNSD–; orange, a high risk; yellow, medium; and green, low. Each color implied the opening of a greater number of activities.

The differences between BJ and Iztapalapa are shown in Tables 3 to 8.

Concept	Benito Juárez		Iztapalapa	
Population 2020¹	434,153		1,835,486	
Area km2	26.63		116,7	
Population density2	16,303 inhab x km²		15,728 inhab x km²	
HDI 3	2010	2015	2010	2015
	0.929	0.944	0.792	0.813

Table 3. General comparison between Benito Juárez and Iztapalapa
¹ INEGI (2020).
² Prepared by the author using local government data (GDF, 2008), Delegación BJ (DBJ, 2016), and INEGI (2020).
³ Municipal Human Development Report 2010-2015. Transforming Mexico from the local (UNDP, 2019).

10 "The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite measure that summarizes the achievements of countries, states, municipalities, or individuals in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge, and a decent standard of living. [...] The Municipal Human Development Index is the same as the geometric mean of its three components: HDI = (Education Index* Income Index * Health Index)" (UNDP, 2019, pp. 314-320).

Percentage of the population aged 15 and over	Benito Juárez	Iztapalapa
Elementary School	11.8%	43.5%
High School	18.2%	30%
Higher Education	69.3%	23.4%
No schooling	0.5%	2.5%
Not specified	0.2%	0.1%

Table 4. Comparison of schooling in Benito Juárez and Iztapalapa 2020. Source: INEGI (2020).

Municipality	Economically active population	Economically inactive population
Benito Juárez	70.4%	29.4%
Iztapalapa	63.5%	36.3%

Table 5. Comparison of economically active and inactive population. Source: INEGI (2020).

	Benito Juárez	Iztapalapa
Population affiliated with health services	79.8%	67.5%
Population eligible for the Popular Insurance	3.4%	24.4%
Population eligible for PEMEX, SDN, or SM1	0.9%	1.3%
Population eligible for ISSSTE2	17.6%	16.2%
Population eligible for IMSS3	65.5%	55.1%
Population affiliated with private insurance	20.5%	2.0%
Population affiliated with another institution	1.1%	1.9%
Beneficiary in Welfare Health Institute	0.3%	0.3%

Table 6. Social security comparison between the municipalities of Benito Juárez and Iztapalapa. Source: INEGI (2020).
[1]Mexican Petroleum Company, Secretary of the Defense or Secretary of the Navy.
[2]Institute of Security and Social Services of State Workers.
[3]Mexican Institute of Social Security.

	Cases per 100,000 population				
	End of JNSD1	End of red traffic light2	1st month with orange3	2nd month with orange4	3rd month with orange5
Benito Juárez	281	485.5	645.4	880.1	1,109.9
Iztapalapa	309.6	495.1	675.2	833.1	1,006.8
Difference %	10.2%	8%	4.60%	-5.3	-9.3

Table 7. Comparison of COVID cases in the municipalities of Benito Juárez and Iztapalapa. Source: Preparation by the author with data from the General Directorate of Epidemiology [DGE] (2020).
[1] To 05-30-2020.
[2] To 06-30-2020.
[3] To 07-30-2020.
[4] To 08-30-2020.
[5] To 09-30-2020.

Deaths per 100,000 population					
	End of JNSD1	End of red traffic light2	1st month with orange3	2nd month with orange4	3rd month with orange5
Benito Juárez	30.4	47.9	57.9	68.2	78.5
Iztapalapa	48.4	70.1	84.1	94.7	104,65
Difference %	59%	48.5%	45.1%	38.8%	33.2%

Table 8. Comparison of COVID deaths in the municipalities of Benito Juárez and Iztapalapa. Source: Preparation by the author with data from the DGE (2020).
[1] To 05-30-2020.
[2] To 06-30-2020.
[3] To 07-30-2020.
[4] To 08-30-2020.
[5] To 09-30-2020.

Figure 4. Mobility in Mexico City between March and September 2020. Source: CONACyT (2020).

The evident inequality in the identified items stands out here because of their relationship with COVID-19-related death: precariousness and educational level.

Iztapalapa, at the end of the JNSD (May 31st), had 10% more cases and 58% more deaths per 100,000 inhabitants than BJ. The figures show a disparity regarding death and illness. These differences decrease over time due to increased mobility. Although the red traffic light was the continuation of the JNSD restrictions, one day after the end of the latter the increase was noticeable (Secretaria de Salud, 2020) (Figure 4).

When the strictness of the lockdowns was relaxed, the class situation ceased to be a differentiating variable. Mobility led inequality-linked factors, such as education, poverty, and work precariousness, to become less relevant. In cases per 100 thousand inhabitants, the trend was reversed. BJ overtook Iztapalapa. In deaths per 100 thousand inhabitants, a considerable reduction was recorded. However, the difference continued to be evident. One of the elements that can explain this is the difference in access to health and its implications (Table 6), especially if it is considered that the proportion of comorbidities was similar in both areas (DGE, 2020).

VI. DISCUSSION

The redensifying failure is not a disparity between figures, but rather a discrepancy between means and ends. The expectation that city building under the principles of sustainability and with the technical force of redensification would bring populationally diverse spaces and avoid the expansion of the urban sprawl, was denied.

The over-densification and the decrease in housing owner-occupiers may be indicators of the format of a scenario similar to that of the compact and supposedly more controlled European city, which may mean in the future that displacement processes around gentrification will be more notorious and commonplace. It could be argued that before suggesting gentrification without displacement, the existence of different times for this to occur should be considered. Gentrification may be building a scenario that will later link it to indirect population expulsions.

Just as redensification is a failure, redrawing social boundaries is also a biopolitical success. Returning to Gržinić (cit. in Estévez, 2018), thanks to the way of urbanizing, lifestyles are consolidated. This is clear in BJ. Its high HDI caused a stir: its similarity to Switzerland was broadcast on different media outlets (Aquino, 2019). The report's coordinator commented: "Human development implies broadening people's opportunities so that they have greater freedom to do and live according to their desires" (Blanco, 2019). Well-being is no longer seen as a pillar for building lifestyles. The quality of life in this municipality is something that the authorities of the area had already boasted: "If [...] Benito Juárez were a country, it would have the twelfth best standard living in the world, on a par with the United States" (Delegación Benito Juárez [D.B.J.], 2009, pp. 13-14). Despite the gloating, it should be noted that living conditions do not come from an improvement intervention; they are linked to processes of locating social groups that already have these conditions and shielding the space against those who do not. The discipline nature of gentrification is notorious. It spatially locates specific relationships in the urban plan.

This ghetto form of privilege exists because of its counterpart, as the other side of a coin. If there was not an opposite of privilege, it would not exist. Not in conceptual terms, much less material. Residential segregation related to land rent is formed, which affects the reproduction of living conditions. Land rent is key: "The rich do not segregate themselves from the poor; the rich segregate the poor. They do it [...] through land rent, for example, [...] to make their status visible by promoting and maintaining the social homogeneity of their neighborhoods" (Rodríguez, 2014) or, indirectly, through redensification. This reflects how the appreciation and depreciation of areas occur in a joint process. The segregated and the segregator, which is not necessarily intentionally so, are paradoxically united by distance.

The reproduction of living conditions restricts or exponentializes the means of interacting with reality. During the pandemic, this was evident.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The disease not only affected bodies with certain conditions, but was also located in spaces marked by inequality, one particularly related to city re-planning.

Policies such as redensification are exposed as security territorialization processes. Not by inscribing new spatial relationships, but by homogenizing them. Not producing "demarcation lines", but, more along the lines of Augé (2007), redrawing and reinforcing boundaries. The inequality between BJ and Iztapalapa was not established with the implementation of Mexico City's urban redevelopment, but rather was a pillar for its consolidation. A biopolitical or necropolitical pillar, depending on the space.

Just as the mechanisms of power are not replaced, biopolitics and necropolitics are not opposites in a hyperconnected and related world. They are configured under the same events but located in different spaces. Their relationship allows the protective lifestyles to affect others that they push toward death. The location of groups with well-being-related conditions in certain spaces, at the same time, locates elsewhere those who do not have them. In the city, during the pandemic, this made visible that the spatialization of death is linked to the spatialization of well-being.

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